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2

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
plaintiff adopts the statement as laid out in Defendants'
petition for Rehearing.

DISPOSITION OF APPEAL FOLLOWING PRIOR HEARING
Plaintiff adopts the statement as laid out in Defendants'
Petition for Rehearing.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT ON THE ISSUE
OF STANDING DOES NOT CONTRAVENE CASE LAW, DOES NOT
CONTRADICT RULE 56(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND DOES NOT TURN UPON REPRESENTATIONS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Defendants' contention that the majority's opinion on the issue

of standing contravenes case law and the language of Rule 56(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and turns upon representations not
properly before the court can only result from a misreading of the
court's opinion.
The majority opinion refers to the "issue of standing raised in
the pleadings" and Defendants interpret this as meaning that the
issue of standing is raised only in the pleadings and that, therefore,
the court didn't demand compliance with Rule 56 (e).

The issue of

standing is indeed raised in the pleadings; but i t is also raised in
the affidavits of James Cunningham (R. 79-80, 89-90).

Defendants

apparently ignore thL' 1;1ajori ty opinion's statement that summary judgrn~nt is proper

"only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
-1-
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interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
any material fact ... "

as~

Having made such a statement, the court is

obviously aware of the proper standards for summary judgment and
i t is fair to assume the court followed those standards.
In their contentions that the "issue of material fact is not
a product of the record but is founded only upon written and oral
representations" by the Plaintiff's attorney (Petition for Rehearin:
at 3), Defendants again have apparently ignored Mr. Cunningham's
affidavits.

Mr. Cunningham's affidavits clearly support Plaintiff';

contention that he and Defendants derived their titles from a
granter.

co1ru1o.:

In his affidavit (R. 89), Mr. Cunningham states that

Phenix Investment purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor (the
corporation which developed Plaintiff's Plat E).

In the same

affidavit he also refers to himself personally as the purchaser:
"After I purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor ... "

This clearly

indicated that Mr. Cunningham considered he and Phenix Investment
to be one and the same or that he controlled Phenix Investment.
He goes on to state that Phenix Investment dissolved Northcrest
Manor and transferred it assets to Northcrest Investment (the
corporation which developed Plat F) , of which he is the president.
Without doubt, this affidavit (R. 79-80) gives rise to the issue
of common granter and standing.
In their Petition for Rehearing, Defendants also state that
the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (19 46),
"requires that for one to have standing to enforce a restrictive
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covenant 1vh ich is a part of a general scheme for building and
development, one must be able to trace the covenant back to a common
grantor (Petition for Rehearing at 2).
Hayes.

That is not the holding of

Hayes held that if it can be shown that the original develop-

er intended a general building scheme, a subsequent grantee can
enforce the restrictive covenant even against a grantee whose deed
does not contain the restrictive covenant.

The question of whether

a common grantor was necessary was not raised in the case.
n:

The

original developer, Douglas Heights Land and Improvement Company,
conveyed several lots in the subdivision to Hubbard Investment
Company.

.o~

Some of the deeds contained the restrictive covenant and

some did not.

Hubbard later conveyed a lot restricted by the coven-

ant to Hayes and a lot not so restricted to Gibbs.

Hayes sued to

enforce the covenant against Gibbs even though his deed did not
contain the restrictive covenant and even though the land was not so
restricted when it was conveyed by the original developer; Hayes
based his right to enforce the covenant on the fact that the original
developer had intended a general building scheme or plan of development.
In his original brief, Plaintiff had made two different arguments for standing -- one based on the uniform plan of development
theory of Hayes v. Gibbs

(see Point IV in Plaintiff's Appeal Brief).

(Plaintiff also made an estoppel argument entitling him to standing
which is not relevant to this discussion.)
Defendants have confused these two theories, ignored issues of
fact raised in Mr. Cunningham's affidavits, completely misstated the
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

holding of Hayes v. Gibbs and assumes that this court, in its
opinion, has done the same.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT UNDISPUTED
AND APPELLANT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY
TO INTRODUCE THE EVIDENCE WHICH WILL SUPPORT
HIS POSITION.
Respondents state that the transfer from Northcrest Manor to
Northcrest Investments of the land owned by Northcrest Manor and
not yet encumbered by restrictive covenants is sufficient to negate
the enforceability of the covenants by lot owners who purchased the
lots developed by Northcrest Manor.
their interpretation of the law.

Respondents are incorrect in

Both in Hayes v. Gibbs and in

the present case the original developers were filing restrictive
covenants on the lots as they were developed and therefore lots
which were developed at a later date were not yet encumbered by
restrictive covenants.

This state of affairs is not sufficient to

break the enforceability of the covenants by the owners of lots
which were encumbered earlier against the owners of lots encumbere:
at a later date.

This would obviously destroy the doctrine of

"common plan of development" which looks at how a tract has in fact
been developed in order to determine enforceability among the vatiQ
owners of lots in a single subdivision.
The Court's ruling that this issue was not proper for sununar:
judgment is correct since the lower court did not afford Plaintif'
the opportunity to show that a common plan of development ei<isteJ·

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That such common plan existed is shown by Mr. Cunningham's affidavit
which states:
"After I purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor,
continued the development of the area maintaining the
same name for the Subdivision and filing restrictive
covenants like those filed for the portion Of the
Subdivision already developed."
(Emphasis added.)

r

(R.

89)

It is clear from the foregoing that the owners of Northcrest
Manor did not consider the subdivision completed at the time of the
purchase of the stock and that they did in fact complete i t by maintaining the same name, the same covenants and the same progressive
tlphabetical denomination of the plats.
It is therefore clear that Plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to introduce the evidence which would prove his case.
If Defendants are so confident that there are no material facts at

issue, it is not clear why they are so vigorous in their efforts to
deny Plaintiff his day in court.

POINT III
APPELLANT WAS INTENDED TO BE THE BENEFICIARY
OF THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS.
Defendants confuse the doctrine applicable to determine what

ct

constitutes a violation with the doctrines of law applicable to

·io

determine who has standing to enforce the covenants.

f'

Defendants cite Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah2d 419, 336 P.2d 122
(1959)

(Petition for Rehearing at 9) to support their contention

that Plaintiff should hu.vc no standing to sue because of the rule
of law vihich requires that all doubts be resolved in favor of the
fr,·r>

011rl

·inn::;

r ri ctecl uc;c of property.
-5-
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The rule set forth in Parrish v. Richards deals with the .
issu;
of what constitutes a violation of restrictive covenant but wa

s nof

intended to apply in determining who can enforce the covenants.

r~

should be clear that the two issues are separate and distinct.
Parrish did not deal with whether plaintiffs had standing to sue bt:
whether defendants had violated the covenants.

Parrish v. Richards
--.:;:

sheds no light on and is not controlling in the present case.
Defendants also rely on the affidavit of Mr. Cunningham to
determine the enforceability of the covenants by Plaintiff (Petitio:
for Rehearing at 8).
To bolster their point that the intention of Mr. Cunninghamis
controlling Defendants cite 89 A.L.R. 812 (Petition for Rehearinga:
9).

This A.L.R. annotation specifically states that the intent of

the parties is to be determined by the documents and not by the
recollection of an individual almost twenty years after the fact.
The rule of construction, contained in the A. L. R. annotation is as
follows:
"Whether one not a party to a restrictive
covenant has a right to enforce it depends on the
intention of the parties imposing it, and this
intention is to be ascertained from the language
of the deed itself."
89 A.L.R. at 812.
It should also be noted that Mr. Cunningham was not the draft~
of the covenants since they had been used before he acquired the 5
of Northcrest Manor.
If, as Defendants claim, the sole purpose of the covenan ts wa'·
to protect lots uphill in Plat F, then it is not clear why the
covenants do not state so but rather make no mention whatsoever of
what the purpose of the covenants is.
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If the logic adopted by Defendants were to prevail, it would
also mean that in Plat F the owners of uphill lots could sue the
owners of downhill lots but not vice versa.

That t!1 is was the intent

of the covenants is certainly not clear under any reasonable reading
of the covenants.
Even assuming, for purposes of discussion, that the intent
stated by Mr. Cunningham can be derived from a reading of the
covenants, it would not follow that Plaintiff has no standing to
sue.

Mr. Cunningham did not state that the only purpose of the

covenants was to maintain the view but rather the primary one.
Obviously he must have intended the other purposes also.

POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD DENY RESPONDENTS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE ANOTHER SUM.~Y
JUDGMENT.
Defendants' request to be given another opportunity for
summary judgment is inappropriate since the court has already
decided that there are material facts which preclude the granting
of summary judgment.
Defendants are also asking the court to pass on the propriety
of allowing the introduction of additional facts in order to obtain
another summary judgment without providing the court with any legal
support for their position.

Plaintiff is therefore unable to refute

arguments which have not been presented to the court.

The lack of

legal support for Defendants' position prevents the existance of a
legal dispute.

counsel for Plaintiff respectfully submits that the
-7-
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I
court should only answer a question when there is a legal

a·

ispute

and should therefore decline to answer Defendants' question.

I

I

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 1978.

;;:;Nc:;a-:::n:::n:->N:T:o~v;;-i:r'n;::::;sl.:k"1'i--"D'-'.u::-:r::-:a::-:n::-d::;-o:-------- I
Attorney for Plaintiff

I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered two copies I
of the foregoing to Anthony L. Rampton and Thomas A. Ellison,
Attorneys for Defendants, at BOO Continental Bank Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84101, on June 14th, 1978.

Nann Novinski-Durando
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